This article is distributed by Agence Global and is republished with permission.

Israeli army violently interrupts a peaceful sit-in demonstration held near the illegal Israeli settlement Karmi Tzur, on the lands of the West Bank town of Halhul near the city of Hebron. (Mamoun Wazwaz, Maan Images)

Of all the many problems U.S. President Barack Obama has to wrestle with, the bitter conflict between Israelis and Palestinians may prove to be the most difficult to resolve. Can he succeed where so many others before him have failed?

While it is generally agreed that the United States has a vital need for an Arab-Israeli peace - if only to protect its own world-wide interests against Arab and Muslim hostility - the obstacles Obama faces are, by any measure, formidable. Most analysts and observers of the century-long conflict tend to be pessimistic about his prospects.

Obama, however, is not without assets. The first of these is his declared determination to tackle the problem "actively and aggressively" - in other words, to use some of his considerable political capital in bringing the parties to the table and persuading them to reach a settlement. He has said clearly - and the world has noted - that his aim is a two-state solution.

Obama's second asset is the understandable concern of any Israeli government not to offend its powerful American ally. Israel is today in a vulnerable situation. The new right-wing government of Binyamin Netanyahu has few international friends. In any event, Israel's image has been badly damaged by the Gaza war. Even though it has many supporters in the United States - including a powerful Lobby and a sympathetic Congress - Israel cannot afford an open clash with Obama. It is all too aware that some prominent Americans have begun to question the nature and value of the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The last thing Israel wants is to trigger a backlash in American opinion against its intimate relationship with the U.S., on which it depends so greatly.

Obama has a third asset in the weight and skills of the two men who are going to be closely involved in shaping American policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They are former senator George Mitchell, Obama's special envoy, and General James Jones, his National Security Adviser. Both know the Middle East well and have direct personal experience of the problem. They form a formidable duo.

Mitchell wrote a celebrated report in 2001 calling for a freeze of Israeli settlements and a Palestinian crackdown on terrorism. Commissioned by President Bill Clinton, the report was delivered to his successor, President George W Bush - who failed to act on its recommendations. Mitchell now has a second chance to put his ideas into practice. He is not someone who will take no for an answer.

General Jones, a former commandant of the Marine Corps, is a distinguished U.S. soldier-diplomat, who rose to become Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), commanding NATO's military forces in Europe. He has undertaken missions in Turkey, the Balkans and Iraq. He was appointed Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security by Condoleezza Rice, Bush's secretary of state, and in that role spent eighteen months in 2007-8, thinking about the security arrangements which would be needed to underpin an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

General Jones has had extensive - but highly discrete - discussions about security with both Israelis and Palestinians. His views have not been published but he is believed to recommend sending a NATO force to the region, supplemented by Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli troops.

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Placed along the Green Line and in the Jordan Valley, its mission would be to protect Israel against infiltrations and other terrorist threats, to set up early warning stations, but also to build up the Palestinians' security capacity, so as to enable them, in due course, to manage without outside forces. The transition period could take several years, so as to allow time for Israel and the Palestinians to build mutual confidence and cooperation.

Israel has always opposed the stationing of international forces on the territory of Israel-Palestine. But this opposition is softening. There is a recognition in Washington that Israel will demand cast-iron guarantees of its long-term security, as well as additional American funding and weaponry to maintain its military "qualitative edge," before it will even consider a two-state solution.

Obama's team will have to deal with a situation in great flux in both the Israeli and Palestinian camps. On the Israeli side, no one can predict how long Netanyahu's fractious coalition will survive. He will evidently do his utmost to avoid final status negotiations.

On the Palestinian side, Hamas has boosted its legitimacy by confronting Israel and surviving the Gaza war. Its control of the government and population of Gaza is now stricter than ever. At the same time, its rival Fatah - and Mahmud Abbas' Palestinian Authority - have suffered an erosion of legitimacy by their absence from the battle. The Palestinian political landscape has thus been profoundly altered.

If Obama's team is to make any progress, the previous American policy towards Hamas will need to be radically revised to take account of these realities on the ground.

The real test for Obama will be the future of Israel's E-1 project, part of its "Greater Jerusalem" expansion plan. It is intended to link the large settlement of Maale Adumim with Jerusalem, and consolidate Israel's annexation of Arab East Jerusalem. If it goes ahead, it will doom all hopes of a Palestinian state.

If Obama does not act to quash the plan, he can forget about a peace settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.