Palestinians gather for a "Peace in Palestine" concert outside the Church of the Nativity in the West Bank city of Bethlehem. (Rami Swidan, Maan Images)

The latest American and European bid to revive the long-dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace process apparently goes something like this:

Tighten the squeeze on Hamas's government to curtail its acquisition of money and weapons. Tip the military balance by pouring in tens of millions of dollars to train and equip security forces loyal to Fatah. Strengthen the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, politically with the kinds of immediate, tangible concessions — money transfers, prisoner releases, lifting of roadblocks — mentioned by the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, at his dinner last Saturday with Abbas.

Then, the thinking goes, press the two sides to agree on a plan involving Israel's withdrawal from areas of the West Bank and creation of a Palestinian state, while conditioning implementation on a Palestinian government that recognizes Israel and renounces violence. Formalize that accord at a ceremony attended by American, European and Arab dignitaries, who would pledge substantial funding for the soon-to-be state.

By then, the choice before the Palestinian people will be clear: a life of isolation and hardship under Hamas, or potential peace and prosperity under a new, internationally backed government. Abbas will schedule early elections or a referendum. Hamas will resist. In the ensuing violent confrontation, Abbas — militarily bolstered and enjoying broad domestic support — will prevail.

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The theory is elegant and appealing. It also is unworkable.

There is, to begin, the colossal suspension of disbelief — of reason, really — in which one is asked to indulge. In the next two years, the Bush administration would have to do what it has shown neither will nor capacity to accomplish in the past six: Focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, engage in skillful diplomacy and extract Israeli concessions. Israel would have to take significant steps under precarious security conditions and for the sake of an uncertain outcome.

Because none of this is likely to happen, even if Abbas's Fatah group were somehow to replace Hamas in this Western-scripted fantasy, Abbas would be handed his third betrayal by the United States and Israel. The first came when, under U.S. pressure, Yasser Arafat named him prime minister in 2004; the second came when he was elected to replace Arafat. On both occasions, promises were made. At the time of writing, Palestinians are still waiting.

But the far more dangerous assumptions relate to Palestinian political realities. A civil war — for that is what it would be — would spell disaster for the Palestinian people. The presidential guard might become a more formidable fighting force than Hamas, but it will remain a far less motivated one, seen by many as doing America's and Israel's bidding. In such a contest, success is far from assured, as we should know from Iraq, Lebanon and, indeed, Palestine itself.

To read the full article please visit the International Herald Tribune's website.