|
The Institute for Middle East Understanding From the Media Rabin's absence leaves a major question unanswered Daoud Kuttab, Bitterlemons.org, Nov 12, 2008
This article was originally published by Bitterlemons.org and is republished with permission.
The late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat liked to call his peace talks with Yitzhak Rabin "the peace of the brave". In spite of the positive connotations of this phrase, however, Palestinians long thought of Rabin in negative terms. He was initially known for his iron fist policies and became infamous for his calls to "break the arms" of the first intifada's stone throwers. Yet this hawkish Israeli politician will nevertheless be remembered for his sincere (albeit hesitant) handshake with Arafat at the White House lawn in September 1993 and for being assassinated two years later by a radical Jewish extremist while leaving a Tel Aviv peace rally. In June 1993, I was the first Palestinian journalist to interview Rabin. At the time, Israel still refused publicly to talk to the PLO, and the Jordan option (the return of parts of the West Bank to Jordan) was still the considered diplomatic solution. I tried to elicit a response from Rabin on the long-term future of the Palestinian territories. "Mr Prime Minister," I asked, "what is your vision for the future of the Palestinians in 10 or 15 years?" After a short pause, Rabin gave me the Labor Party's standard reply. "I believe that the future of the Palestinians must be somehow connected with Jordan." Unknown to me at the time, Rabin's envoys were in fact conducting secret talks with the PLO in Oslo, which led, among other things, to the recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to a de facto recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Now, however, 15 years later, we seem to be back at the point of my pre-Oslo interview. Israel has reverted to the useless tactic of denigrating legitimate Palestinian leaders and denying the right of self-determination to the people living under its inhumane occupation and military siege, especially the Palestinians in Gaza. While there are no talks now about Jordan having a direct role in the administration of the West Bank, Egypt, which administered Gaza between 1948-1967, is the key player both in the Palestinian reconciliation effort as well as in potentially having to put troops on the ground in Gaza. If the leaders of the Hamas-controlled Strip reject the Egyptian reconciliation plan that includes new elections and a revamping of the Palestinian security apparatus, we might see an Arab-led force retaking the Strip.
Israel must now answer what it intends to do with the people and land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Will Israelis and Palestinians share power or will they share land. Sharing power means for both people to live in a single bi-national state. Until now, Israelis seem opposed to any long-term settlement that dilutes the Jewish majority of Israel. The two-state solution, which was legally adopted by the Palestine National Council in 1988, appeared to have been accepted by Rabin when he signed the Oslo accords (a partial reversal of what he had told me about his expectation that the West Bank would eventually be connected somehow to Jordan). But Israeli actions since, especially after Rabin's assassination, seem to indicate that this issue has not been completely settled within the Israeli political establishment. Certainly, if Israel has accepted the concept of a two state solution, it has not succeeded in translating this strategy into policy. Israeli actions on the ground, especially with respect to the continuing settlement expansion, indicate that Israel wants to keep the land without sharing power with its indigenous population. Such a strategy will eventually mean that what is true today in reality will become a formal framework in the future, i.e., a dual legal system for Palestinians and Jews. It is no wonder that former US President Jimmy Carter worries that this will become an apartheid regime. Israeli intransigence, meanwhile, has had its effect on Palestinian thinking as well. In 1988, Palestinians who used to favor a one-state solution had come to accept its impossibility and therefore opted for the two-state solution. Recently, however, there has been a revival of the one-state option among Palestinians. Dividing the land into two sovereign states today seems as far-fetched as a one-state solution did then, primarily because of the absence of a strong and visionary Israeli leader. Rabin might have been ready to finalize the land-for-peace deal in the mid-1990s but his plans were cut short by the bullet of a Jewish fundamentalist. The Israeli establishment since has yet to decide what it wants. In particular, Israel needs to answer the simple question I asked Rabin 15 years ago. What does Israel want to do with the Palestinians under its direct military rule in Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and rural West Bank areas as well as those under its indirect military rule in West Bank cities and the Gaza Strip? Rabin was not given a chance to fully and convincingly answer the question. No Israeli leader since has. Daoud Kuttab, a Palestinian columnist, is the director general of Community Media Network, a media NGO that is registered in Jordan and Palestine. © 2008 Bitterlemons.org 
| ||||||||||||
